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POINT ONE 
GRAYSTONErS FACT ARGUMENTS SHOULD 
ALL BE DISREGARDED AS THEY INTERPRET 
FACTS IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO GRAYSTONE 
This appeal is taken from a summary judgment. It is 
well established that on summary judgment the appellate court 
will review the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party (DeBry). See e.g., Mountain States, Etc. v. Atkin, 
Wrights & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984): 
Therefore, under Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, summary judgment can be 
granted only if the record shows that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact. . .Doubts, uncertainties, or 
inferences, concerning issues of fact must be 
construed in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment. (Emphasis 
added.) 
See also, Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333 
(Utah 1983); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1984); 
Frisbee v. K & K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387. 
On virtually every page, Graystone's brief violates 
this standard rule. Graystone always interprets the facts in the 
light most favorable to Graystone. Indeed, Graystone's brief 
sounds more like a jury argument than an appellate brief. 
Moreover, many of Graystone's fact arguments are not: even 
relevant. Here are several examples: 
A. The 60% Fee. 
Graystone argues that DeBry earned the "equivalent of a 
60% fee." (Brief of Respondent, at p. 8.) In fact, Graystone 
proposed a contingent fee of $18,300. Before the contract was 
changed to a contingent fee, DeBry was paid approximately $5,000 
on an hourly basis- (R. 001343.) Thus, DeBry's total fee on the 
case was $23,300. On the surface, that appears to be a handsome 
fee. However, that turns out to be approximately 38% of the 
settlement (not 60% as Graystone claims) or approximately $32 per 
hour1. 
This modest fee can be put in perspective by comparing 
defense costs. Although there is nothing in the record to show 
defense costs, the court can take judicial notice of standard 
defense costs in the community. It is likely that the losing 
attorneys were paid $75-$125 per hour in the underlying case. 
Management Committee of Graystone Pines Homeowners Assn. v. 
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). Moreoever, it 
is likely that Graystone Pines is paying their present attorneys 
$100-$150 per hour. 
xFifty dollars ($50) per hour for approximately 100 hours 
prior to the switch to a contingent fee, and 626 hours 
thereafter. See R.001296. 
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B. Retired Folks. 
Graystone's brief is laced with comments regarding the 
"retired folks on fixed incomes•" See e.g., Brief of Respondent, 
at p. 11 and 41. Such comments are not relevant to any issue in 
the case, and are a clear attempt to seek sympathy of the court. 
However, there is another version of the evidence. The 
president of Graystone Pines Homeowner's Assn. involved in this 
case was a top sales manager for Proctor & Gamble. Another 
former president involved in this case was a high executive with 
an oil company and a very wealthy man. A third former president 
of Graystone involved in this case laughed at DeBry's claim for 
$50 per hour, because he (Graystone's former president) earned 
$100 to $150 per hour. The members of Graystone Pines 
Homeowner's Assn., contrary to respondent's allusions, range from 
upper middle class to wealthy. (See Brief of Appellant, Ex-
hibit E, or R. 001667-001668.) 
C. Punishment or Extortion. 
Graystone argues that DeBry's motive was, ". . .either 
to punish the homeowners. . .or to extort a higher fee. . .(Brief 
of Respondent, at p. 29-30.) The raising of that issue is 
improper. It was not framed by the pleadings and was never 
presented below. 
Assuming relevance, a factfinder could conclude that 
DeBry's claim was based upon a reasonable desire to be paid more 
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for his work than a plumber would be paid. Graystone wanted to 
pay DeBry about $32 per hour while the losing attorney was paid 
$75-$125 per hour. (Compare para. A, above.) See also, St. Luke 
10:7: ". • .The labourer is worthy of his hire."' 
D. Multiple Defendants. 
Graystone made much of the fact that DeBry named 
multiple defendants in the proceedings below. (Brief of 
Respondent, at p. 12 & 13.) Those other defendants were 
dismissed by the trial court and no appeal has been pursued. 
The basis for joining other parties below was statutory: 
The compensation of an attorney and counselor 
for his services is governed by agreement, 
express or implied, which is not restrained 
by law. From the commencement of an action, 
or the service of an answer containing a 
counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a 
party has a lien upon his client's cause of 
action or counterclaim, which attaches to a 
verdict, report, decision or judgment in his 
client's favor and to the proceeds thereof in 
whosoever hands they may come, and cannot be 
affected by any settlement between the 
parties before or after judgment. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-51-41. 
The other parties named by DeBry were persons who, in 
one way or another, had held the settlement fund. According to 
the statute, they could be named as parties. However, late in 
the case, the court ordered defendant Graystone Pines to hold the 
disputed fund in escrow. (R. 001495-001497.) At that point, 
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there was sufficient security that DeBry did not need to pursue 
the appeal against those third parties. 
In summary, there is evidence in the record from which 
a jury could conclude that it was reasonable and prudent for 
DeBry to join other third parties in the proceedings below. 
E. Multiple Pleadings. 
Graystone alleges bad faith. As support for this 
argument, Graystone says there were over 250 pleadings in this 
case. 
To begin with, this same argument was presented to the 
trial court judge. It is impossible to make any determination of 
good faith or bad faith based merely on counting pleadings. 
The trial court, being intimately familiar with the substance of 
the file, rejected Graystone's argument. (See Point Nine, 
below.) Now Graystone repeats that argument to an appellate 
court which Graystone knows has no familiarity with the substance 
of the pleadings. 
More importantly, Graystone has failed to advise the 
court that over 1/3 of the 250 pleadings relate to Graystone's 
malpractice claim against DeBry. Graystone's malpractice claim 
against DeBry was motivated solely for harassment and revenge. 
(See Deposition of John Webster, at p. 101 and 163.) 
Furthermore, Graystone's malpractice claim of $78,000 was based 
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upon fraudulent evidence. (See Affidavit of Woodward, at R. 
001533 and Exhibit 1 hereto.) 
That malpractice claim was eventually settled for a 
nuisance value of $3,500.2 (R. 001841-001846; Exhibit 2 hereto, 
"Settlement Agreement.") Although the malpractice settlement was 
to be kept confidential, DeBry must refer to that settlement in 
order to rebut Graystone's argument about "250" pleadings in the 
file. The fact is that over 1/3 of those pleadings were 
generated by Graystone on a separate and probably frivolous 
issue. 
P. Settlement Value of the Underlying Case. 
Most of Graystone's brief is devoted to complicated 
computations which purport to show the settlement value of the 
underlying case. (See Brief of Respondent, at p. 23-29.) For 
example, Graystone says? 
1. There was a 7 5% chance of 
recovering somewhere between 
$50,000 and $80,000 at trial. 
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 25.) 
2. The maximum anticipated jury award 
at the second trial was $92,954. 
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 26.) 
^The payment of $3,500 was not an admission of fault; but 
rather, an economic reality that it would cost more to defend the 
claim. Furthermore, the standard malpractice insurance policy 
requires a party to accept a reasonable settlement. 
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3. $75,000 would become the ceiling 
for a settlement. (Brief of 
Respondent, at p. 27 and 28.) 
However, there is another version of the evidence. 
1. There was a reasonable chance of a 
jury verdict substantially in 
excess of $100,000. 
2. The settlement value of the case 
was $90,000 or more. 
(Brief of Appellant, at Exhibit E, para. 14. R. 001668.) 
All of Graystone's arguments fail if the jury believes 
this latter version of the evidence. 
G. Trial v. Settlement. 
Graystone's brief makes a convoluted computation of 
DeBry's fee under various scenarios. Graystone concludes that 
DeBry made more money—because the case was settled for $61,000— 
than he would have had the case proceeded to trial. (Brief of 
Respondent, at p. 27-29.) 
However, those computations are all based upon a false 
premise. Graystone assumed that the homeowners had to grab an 
immediate settlement for $61,000 or else go to trial. (Brief of 
Respondents t p. 27-29.) 
There is testimony in the record that the homeowners 
settled their case approximately one month before trial. 
Settlements are always higher a week before trial, or a day 
before trial or even during the trial. In fact, in the first 
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trial, the best offer was made just one day before trial. There 
was a very low probability that there would have ever needed to 
be any second trial- If the parties had continued to negotiate, 
during that final month, the case would probably have settled for 
$90,000 or more- A large majority of all experienced attorneys 
would have advised the homeowners to reject the $61,000 offer, 
and continue to negotiate during that final month. (Brief of 
Appellant, Exhibit E, at para. 5, 6, 7, and 14; R. 001664-
001668.) 
Also, Graystone's brief forgets that if the case were 
settled during that last month, DeBry would not have had to pay 
any substitute counsel-
H. War of Attrition. 
Graystone suggests that this is a war of attrition in 
which DeBry has the upper hand by using staff attorneys. (Brief 
of Respondent, p. 30, n. 10.) There is absolutely nothing in 
the record to support this assertion. Furthermore, the relevance 
of this assertion is questionable. 
In fact, DeBry gets no advantage. Every hour the DeBry 
staff works on this case must be diverted from other fee-
generating businessc It really makes no difference whether DeBry 
pays $100 per hour for outside legal service, or whether DeBry 
loses $100 in fees to have the same work done in-house-
8 
I. DeBryrs Intent, 
DeBry's opening brief argued that the agreement called 
for two alternative methods to compute fees- If Graystone 
controlled the settlement negotiations, the fee was to be $50 per 
hour; if DeBry controlled the settlement negotiations, the fee 
was to be 30%. (Brief of Appellant, at Points I and II.) 
Graystone's brief argues that initially DeBry had no 
such intent. Graystone argues that the alternative fee theory 
came many months or years after the formation contract. (Brief 
of Respondent, at p. 36 and 37.) Graystone's theory is based 
upon flimsy circumstantial evidence. Furthermore, the fact 
theory was not presented below. 
Contrary to what Graystone says, a factfinder might 
conclude that the parties intended exactly what they said: "I 
would accept the contingent fee only if I had complete and 
unfettered control over any settlement." (R. 001006.) 
To the extent that intent is an issue in the case, 
intent is always a jury issue. Colonial Leasing Co. of New 
England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Const. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 488; 
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714; Morris v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Utah 1983). 
J. Greed. 
Graystone's brief is largely an ad hominem attack on 
DeBry. Graystone paints the picture of a ruthless attorney whose 
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object was to "extort" money from "retired folks." (Brief of 
Respondent, pp. 29-30, 11.) 
Clearly, DeBry's reputation is not an issue in the case 
and Graystone knows it. 
Even assuming relevance, a factfinder could easily 
construe the facts in a different light. At the outset, DeBry 
reduced his regular hourly fee from $70 per hour to $50 per hour 
as a favor to Graystone. (R. 000688.) Later, when DeBry 
increased his regular billing rate for other clients to $90 per 
hour, DeBry did not raise his rates to Graystone. (R. 001006.) 
Still later, DeBry agreed, at Graystone's urging, to switch over 
to a contingent fee even though this case did not lend itself to 
such an arrangement. Few other attorneys would have accepted a 
contingent fee, (R* 000688, 001587.) DeBry even encouraged 
Graystone to shop around for a new attorney. (R. 000688.) 
When a trial date was set, DeBry was even willing to 
give up part of his fee rather than delay the case. (R. 001014.) 
(Most lawyers would have simply delayed the case.) 
Graystone did not return the same degree of good faith. 
In the final trial preparations, Graystone tried to trick the 
court as well as its own attorney in order to unfairly increase 
the damage award. (See Point Eight, below. Also, Affidavit of 
Woodward, Exhibit 1 hereto.) 
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Although the first trial was lost, DeBry won a 
noteworthy victory on the appeal. Management Committee of 
Graystone Pines Homeowner's Assn. v. Graystone Pines, 652 P.2d 
896 (Utah 1982) . 
When the second trial was still nearly a month away, 
the parties began some settlement negotiations. Graystone 
accepted a settlement offer of $61,000 against DeBry's advice. 
(R. 001009.) This settlement was not based upon economic 
realities. Rather, Graystone settled because they didn't want to 
go through the stress of a second trial. (R. 000688; 001005, 
001011, 001647; 001315.) If Graystone had followed DeBry's 
advice for another few weeks, the case could have been settled 
without a trial for $90,000 or more. (R. 001665, para. 6; 
001688, para. 14.) 
In the end, DeBry was only paid about $30 per hour for 
his work. The losing attorney was paid around $75-$100 per hour 
for the same case. (See Point 1(A), above.) When a lawyer takes 
a case on a contingent fee, the lawyer accepts the risk of 
losing. However, the lawyer does not necessarily take the risk 
that his client will become overstressed at the thought of a 
trial. 
When DeBry raised the fee dispute, Graystone promptly 
invented a frivolous malpractice action to punish DeBry. That 
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action was later settled for "nuisance value." (See Point 1(E), 
above.) 
POINT TWO 
GRAYSTONEffS BRIEF CITES NO 
AUTHORITY FOR THE KEY ISSUE IN THIS CASE 
DeBry's opening brief argued that the fee agreement was 
not an absolute prohibition on the client's power to settle the 
case; rather, the agreement merely provided for an alternative 
method of computing fees (30% if DeBry controlled the settlement, 
and $50 per hour if Graystone controlled the settlement). 
DeBry's brief relied upon several authorities including the 
leading text on attorney fees- (See Brief of Appellant, at p. 6 
and Exhibit G thereto.) 
Graystone's brief does not cite a single case in 
opposition to DeBry's theory on alternative fee arrangements. 
(See Brief of Respondent, at p. 32-33, 36-37,) 
Instead, Graystone argues, at length, that a contract 
is void if it restricts a client's right to settle. However, 
those arguments are simply not relevant. This is not a case 
where the client's right to settle is restricted. Rather, this 
is a case where the parties have agreed on an alternate fee if 
the client settles without approval of counsel. 
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POINT THREE 
THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY EVIL 
ABOUT AN ATTORNEY CONTROLLING SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS 
Although the issue is irrelevant (see Point Two, 
above), this court should not be left with the impression that 
there is something evil about an attorney controlling settlement 
negotiations. 
Courts have recognized that covenants against 
settlement without consent are the result of an understandable 
need attorneys have to protect their investment in a case. Duke 
v. Harper, 8 Mo.App. 296 (1886); In Re: Snyder, 190 N.Y. 66, 82 
N.E. 742, 743 (1907) (dissenting opinion). In some 
jurisdictions, such covenants are valid under statutory or case 
law. Goldberg's Loan Office v. Evans, 37 P.2d 286 (Okla. 1934); 
Benton v. Dow Chemical Company, 351 S.W.2d 899 (Tex.App. 1961); 
Succession of Vlaho, 140 So.2d 226 (La. 1962). 
Even those jurisdictions which hold such covenants to 
be invalid, recognize that such covenants are not intrinsically 
evil. Davis v. Webber, 49 S.W. 822, 825 (1899), for example, 
stated: 
13 
While the contract sued upon is against 
public policy and, therefore void, yet the 
making of such a contract is neither malum 
prohibitum nor malum in se. It is not even 
of questionable propriety. 
Recognizing the dilemma attorneys face when they are 
paid on a contingent basis, Arkansas' attorney's lien statute now 
provides that if a contingent fee case is settled without the 
attorney's consent, the attorney may recover in quantum meruit, 
and his fee will not be limited by the settlement amount. Ark. 
Stat. §25-301; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Hurst, 198 Ark. 
546, 129 S.W.2d 970 (Ark. 1939). 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT SHOULD 
NOT INTERPRET AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT 
LANGUAGE ON A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 
Graystone argues that the contract should not be 
interpreted to set up an alterative fee as claim€*d by DeBry. 
(Brief of Respondent, p. 32-34.) The specific language to be 
interpreted is as follows: 
. . .1 would accept the contingent fee only 
if I had complete and unfettered control over 
any settlement. 
If the contingent fee proposed is for any 
reason unworkable, I would continue to work 
on an hourly basis. 
(R. 1006 emphasis from original.) 
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Graystone claims that language should be strictly 
construed against DeBry. (Brief of Respondent, at p. 32-34-) 
However, the issue is not how to interpret a contract. Rather, 
the issue is who should interpret the contract. 
If the language is unambiguous on its face, the court 
will construe the contract. Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 
716 (Utah 1985). However, the canon of construction upon which 
Graystone relies can only be used as part of an evidentiary 
hearing or trial. Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 582, 
586, (Ut.App. 1986). 
This case was decided on summary judgment, and the 
trial court incorrectly determined there was no question of fact. 
(R. 1294-1296.) Therefore, this court should review the case 
under a correctness standard without resort to inferences of fact 
or canons of construction. Craig Food Industries v. Weihing, 746 
P.2d 279, 283 (Ut.App. 1987). 
On the other hand, if there is any ambiguity, the case 
cannot be decided on summary judgment. The case must be remanded 
for further factual development. Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 
supra. 
Finally, Graystone's brief cited several cases to 
illustrate how other courts have interpreted a fee agreement 
which restricts the client's right to settle. (See Brief of 
Respondent, at p. 18-22.) However, all of Graystone's cases were 
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decided after a full trial or an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, 
Graystone's cases are not helpful in analyzing a summary judgment 
ruling. 
POINT FIVE 
REASONABLENESS IS 
A JURY ISSUE 
Graystone vigorously argues that DeBry's conduct was 
unreasonable. (Brief of Respondent, at p. 23-24.) Graystone 
further argues that it was reasonable for the homeowners to 
proceed with their settlement against DeBry's advice. (Brief of 
Respondent, at p. 24-25.) Finally, Graystone argues that the 30% 
contingent fee was reasonable under the circumstances. (Brief of 
Respondent, at p. 25-29.) 
The trouble with these arguments is that this is a 
summary judgment motion. There has been no trial and no 
evidentiary hearing where the court could develop the factual 
basis for a finding of reasonableness. Indeed, the facts on the 
record can easily be construed to show that Graystone did not act 
reasonably. (See Point One, above.) 
Reasonableness is usually an issue for the jury to 
decide. C & H Construction and Paving Co., Inc. v. Citizen's 
Bank, 597 P.2d 1190, 93 N.M. 150 (N.M.App. 1979). If this case 
is to be decided on the basis of reasonableness—as opposed to 
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the bare language of the contract—the case should be remanded 
for a trial. 
POINT SIX 
GRAYSTONE IGNORES THE 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN A RECITAL AND A COVENANT 
Graystone argues that the contract was only intended to 
restrict Graystone from pressing for an unwise trial. (Brief of 
Respondent/ p. 32-35.) That argument relies on one part of the 
March 4f 1980 letter which sets forth a reason why DeBry insisted 
on complete control over settlement. DeBry wrote: 
Clients are sometimes overly optimistic 
because they are not paying anything to their 
attorney. Thusf they may turn down 
reasonable settlement offers because it costs 
them nothing to gamble on the results of the 
trial. Therefore/ I would accept a 
contingent fee only if I had complete and 
unfettered control over any settlement. 
(R. 001006.) 
The law makes a distinction between a recital in a 
contract and a covenant. Recitals generally describe background 
and do not have the force of a contractual stipulation. In Re: 
Taxes
 f 380 P.2d 156 (Haw. 1963); Hulin v. Veach, 35 P.2d 253 (Or. 
1934); 17 AmJur.2d/ "Contracts," §268. Furthermore, if the 
operative part of the contract is not ambiguous, the operative 
part controls even if it is inconsistent with the recital. 
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Jamison v. Franklin Life Insurance Co., 60 Ariz. 308, 136 P.2d 
265 (Ariz. 1943); 17 AmJur.2d, "Contracts," §268. 
It is true that recitals may be considered to determine 
the parties intent. However, the court will only resort to such 
tools of construction when the meaning of the operative language 
is unclear. Rains v. Walby, 537 P.2d 833 (Wash.App. 1975). 
However, if the language is unclear, the matter should not be 
decided on summary judgment. 
This contract was contained within a letter. But it is 
clear that the following language was a recital: 
Clients are sometimes overly oprimistic 
because they are not paying anything to their 
attorney. Thus, they may turn down 
reasonable settlement offers becuase it costs 
them nothing to gamble on the results of the 
trial. 
(Re 000148, para. 4.) The language above merely describes the 
background. 
It is also clear that the operative language is as 
follows: 
I would accept the contingent fee only 
if I had complete and unfettered control over 
any settlement. 
If the contingent fee proposal is for 
any reason unworkable, I would continue to 
work on an hourly basis, 
(R. 00014, para. 4 and 5.) 
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It is hard to imagine more unambiguous langauge than "complete 
and unfettered control." Such unambiguous language can only 
include both decisions to turn down a settlement and decisions to 
accept one. This operative language governs* 
POINT SEVEN 
GRAYSTONErS BRIEF FAILS 
TO DISCUSS THE KEY ISSUE OF SEVERABILITY 
The threshold issue in this case is whether the 
underlying contract violates public policy. If the contract does 
not offend public policy, it should be enforced. However, if the 
underlying contract does violate public policy, the court is 
immediately faced with the doctrine of severability. In other 
words, does the entire contract fall^ or does the invalid portion 
(DeBry to control settlement negotiations) fall; while leaving 
the valid portion intact (30% fee). 
DeBry's theories on severability were supported by In 
Re: Snyder, 82 N.E. 742, 190 N.Y. 66 (1907). (Exhibit 3.) 
This is consistent with general contract law which does not limit 
quantum meruit recovery to the amount of contractual compensa-
tion. Corbin on Contracts, §1107, 1109 (1964) Ed.). The only 
^If the entire contract falls, the parties revert to quantum 
meruit. See Banta v. Banta, 82 N.Y.S. 113; In Re: Snyder, 190 
N.Y.66, 82 N.E. 742 (N.Y. App. 1907). 
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authority cited by defendants which is directly on point is 
Lefkowitz v. Leblanq, 187 N.Y.S. 520 (S.Ct. 1921), decided by a 
lesser court than Snyder. Lefkowitz is also questionable 
authority in light of In re; Montgomery's Estate, 272 N.Y. 323, 
6 N.E.2d 40 (1936) which allowed quantum meruit recovery of 
attorney fees in excess of the contractual compensation.4 The 
other cases cited by defendants were not generally in point 
because they involved settlement provisions which were severable 
from the remainder of the contract. 
POINT EIGHT 
GRAYSTONE'S FRAUD IS NOT 
SHIELDED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
During the preparations for the underlying trial, 
Graystone manufactured fake evidence. (See Affidavit of Mark 
Woodward, R. 001533 and Exhibit 1 hereto.) This faked evidence 
was aimed at the court, the opposing party, and Graystone's 
attorney DeBry. DeBry was tricked by the faked evidence. (See 
Affidavit of Robert J. DeBry, at R. 001539 and Exhibit 4 
*In a quantum meruit trial, a jury is still entitled to look 
at the contract as one of the factors it weighs in considering 
what is reasonable under all the facts and circumstances. 
Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 130 F.Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 
1955); 57 ALR.2d 13, Section 14. In this case, where there are 
two alternative fees, a jury could consider both versions of the 
contract in determining what it thought was reasonable. 
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hereto.) Interestingly/ Graystone does not deny the fraud. 
Indeed, there is not even a counter-affidavit in the file. 
(Compare Affidavit of Mark Woodard, at R. 001533 and Exhibit 1.) 
Rather, Graystone merely seeks to hide its fraud behind the 
curtain of the statute of limitations. (Brief of Respondent, at 
p. 42-43.) 
It is true that an affirmative claim under the statute 
of limitations would be barred. However, this is not an 
affirmative claim for fraud. Ratherf fraud arises in this case 
as a defense. Specifically, Graystone seeks to pay attorney fees 
based upon a 30% contingent fee arrangement. DeBry defends 
against that particular agreement by saying that it was procured 
by fraud. Where fraud is raised as a defense, the statute of 
limitations does not apply. Ackmann v. Merchant's Mtg. & Trust 
Corp., 645 P.2d 7 (Colo. 1982); Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. 
Johnston, 547 P.2d 1302 (Okla. 1976); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. 
v. Apodaca, 524 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1974). 
Graystone also makes much of the fact that the fraud 
was not asserted until rather late in the litigation. However, 
as the date on the Woodward affidavit shows (Exhibit 1), DeBry 
was not able to locate the witness and obtain the necessary 
evidence until rather late in the litigation.^ 
^Compare Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Finally, Graystone asserts that the only concrete 
fraudulent representation occurred in August of 1980. (Brief of 
Respondent, at p. 41, n. 12-) Assuming, arguendo, that the fraud 
occurred in August of 1980, certainly DeBry had an absolute right 
to withdraw at that time. If DeBry had withdrawn, he would have 
clearly been entitled to a fee based upon quantum meruit. 
Speiser, §4:10.) 
Graystone says that DeBry waived any right to raise 
fraud at a later time because DeBry continued to perform under 
the contract after May of 1980. However, DeBry has explained 
that he had a duty to the court and to innocent third parties to 
continue the lawsuit. (See Affidavit of Robert J. DeBry, at R. 
001540 and Exhibit 4, para. 14.) Whether or not such conduct 
constitutes a waiver is a pure fact issue which cannot be 
decided on summary judgment. Doujotos v. Leventhal, 271 Mass. 
280, 171 N.E. 445, 69 ALR 1080; Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 
(Utah 1980). 
POINT NINE 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
Graystone claims damages for bad faith. Graystone 
relies upon Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Rule 33 provides for "just damages" if the appeal is "frivolous." 
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There is nothing at all frivolous about this appeal. 
DeBry contends that the fee agreement provides for an alternative 
fee (30% if DeBry controls the settlement negotiations and $50 
per hour if Graystone controls the settlement negotiations). 
DeBry's theory is supported by authority including the leading 
text on attorney frees. (See Brief of Appellant, at p. 6 and 7). 
DeBry also contends that the agreement for a 30% contingent fee 
is not severable. Thereforef if the provision is invalid, the 
fee should be determined by quantum meruit. This theory is 
likewise supported by solid authority. (See Brief of Appellant, 
at p. 8-) 
Moreover, this lawsuit include allegations of fraud 
against Graystone. (See Brief of Appellant, at Point Six.) 
Graystone doesn't deny their fraud. Rather, Graystone tries to 
avoid the issue of fraud by resorting to technicalities. (See 
Point Eight, above.) 
Finally, all of Graystone's arguments on bad faith 
were presented to the trial court. The trial court being more 
familiar with the proceedings, ruled against Graystone. (R. 
001739-001742.) Thus, the standard of review on this issue is 
abuse of discretion. See Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 
(Utah 1976); Peatross v. Board of Comm'rs. of Salt Lake County, 
555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976). 
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POINT TEN 
DEBRY IS ENTITLED TO 
INTEREST ON HIS CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Graystone argues that DeBry should not be allowed to 
collect interest on his fees. (Brief of Respondent, p. 44-48.) 
The matter of interest is really no longer an issue. 
The trial court's order and judgment, dated March 25, 1988, 
specifically grants $5,506.49 in interest out of a total of 
$24,827.84, which the court found Graystone owed DeBry. (R. 
001858-001861; see Exhibit 5.) The amount of interest awarded or 
any amount to be later determined to have accrued was never 
contested by Graystone. 
Graystone argues that it tendered payment and was 
refused. Graystone argues, therefore, it no longer should be 
expected to pay the interest due. 
DeBry declined acceptance of the check for $24,827.84 
because he did not want to prejudice his claim for additional 
fees which may be found due him on appeal. Once his concerns 
were allayed by a stipulation of the parties, DeBry was willing 
to accept the partial payment represented by the check on the 
"Where a right to interest in conceded at trial, its 
allowance cannot be complained of on appeal* Reed v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co., 135 Mo. 661, 37 S.W. 904. 
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condition that it not preclude any potential for additional 
recovery- (R. 001858-001862; see Exhibit 5-) 
Graystone also argues that DeBry cannot charge interest 
unless the client has so agreed in advance. Graystone's argument 
and citations on this issue are simply not on point. The 
authorities Graystone cites speak of an attorney's normal billing 
practices not a fees dispute pending before the court. The issue 
at hand is not one of unpaid accounts receivable but of an 
undetermined debt which only becomes certain upon judgment or 
decision of the court. (See Speiser, §18.17.) The concern 
which Graystonefs authorities address is that an unagreed 
imposition of interest could be used as unfair leverage by an 
attorney. However, putting the facts in context, interest 
imposed by judgment is less a bargaining weapon than is non-
payment of a fee. 
In summary, Graystonefs arguments should be limited to 
issues raised below. Furthermore, whether Graystone's tender was 
conditional or not is irrelevant. Money owed DeBry by Graystone, 
whether all or part, is presently unpaid and is accruing 
interest. The fund is DeBry's and any interest earned on it is 
rightfully his as well. ^ \ 
DATED this /~7 day of ^Jd^t^dZ/i^y , 1989. 
ROBiprr J . DEBR^CTASSOCIATES 
Attorneys f o ^ - ^ p g i ^ a n t 
By i>^^rL^ i ? / P ^ ^ l 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF (DeBry v. Graystone Pines Homeowners Assn.) 
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following: 77 
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M. David Eckersley 
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Jeffrey Shields 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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EXHIBIT 1 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
My name is Mark Woodward. I give the following 
under oath: 
1. Sometime in 1980 I did some cement patchwork 
at the Graystone Pines condos. 
2. I was hired to do that work by Bill Kaiser 
who I think was president. 
3. After I had finished the cement patchwork, 
Mr. Kaiser asked me to give a bid for sealing around the 
joints where the wall meets the floor. 
4. At Mr. Kaiser's request, I gave an inflated 
bid of $78,000. Both Mr. Kaiser and I knew that it would 
not cost anywhere near $78,000 to do the work, but I gave 
that inflated bid as a favor to Mr. Kaiser. 
5. It has been so long ago that I don't recall 
the exact amount of my true bid, but it was probably less 
than $10,000. 
DATED this //ffiday of ^ > { ^ £ ^ 1986. 
MARK WOODWARD 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this A ^ day of 
tifcrt/'UsU 1986. 
:AKY PUBLIC ~ J / y A ft 
residing at: , %/f^A^KP 
My Commission Expires 
%-P-qp— 
EXHIBIT 2 
•? r v — » ^ v or.' "' v 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney, Pro Se 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
MAR 2 5 1988 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAYSTONE PINES 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant and 
Counterplaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN WEBSTER, ROY NIELSON, 
FLORANCE LEWON, CARLOS CROFT, 
and LOUISE MALLONEE, as the 
BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE 
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION on behalf of 
the owners of all units in 
Graystone Pines Condominiums, 
Interveners and 
Counterplaintiffs. 
STIPULATION, ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-5167 
JUDGE RAYMOND UNO 
STIPULATION 
1. On April 25, 1986, this court entered its order to the 
effect that " . . . plaintiff's recovery on his claim for 
attorney's fees shall not exceed the sum of $18,300." (Copy 
attached.) Thus, the court, as a matter of law, placed a lid 
on attorney fees at $18,300; however, the court left open the 
possibility that attorney fees may eventually be set at less 
than $18,300. 
2. Defendant and counter plaintiffs Graystone Pines 
Homeowners Association and John Webster; Ray Nielson; Florance 
Lewon; Carlos Croft; and Louise Mallonee, individually and as 
the Board of Managers of the Graystone Pines Homeowners 
Association (hereafter referred to collectively as Graystone) 
hereby waive any and all rights they may have under this 
court's order of April 21, 1986 to contend, or to offer 
evidence, or to present argument to the effect that DeBry's 
attorney fee snould be set at less than $18,300. 
3. DeBry does not stipulate that the attorney's fee 
should be set at $18,300 or any lesser amount. DeBry 
specifically contends that the attorney's fee should be set in 
excess of $18,300. 
4. DeBry and Graystone jointly stipulate that there is no 
further triable issue in this case in that this court has ruled 
as a matter of law that attorney fees should not be in excess 
of $18,300; and by virtue cf Graystone's stipulation (No. 2, 
above), there is no factual basis for an award of attorney fees 
of less than $18,300. 
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5. Therefore, judgment may be entered against defendant 
Graysr.one Pines Homeowners Association and in plaintiff's favor 
on his claim for attorney fees for services rendered witn 
respect to Graystone Pines Homeowners Association v. Bush, et 
al., Civil No. C79-763, in the maximum amount permitted by the 
court's order dated April 21, 1986, granting counterplaintiffs' 
partial summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's claim for 
attorney fees, that maximum amount being $18,300, plus 
$1,021.35 in unreimbursed costs, for a total of $19,321.35, 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from 
July 1, 1983, until judgment is entered, said ju.;ment to bear 
interest at the legal rate for judgments from entry until 
paid. This judgment shall be a final judgment and may be 
appealed by DeBry. Graystone stipulates that they will not 
appeal or cross-appeal from the judgment, except that Graystone 
may cross-appeal the award of interest on the attorney fees and 
costs awarded by the judgmen- It is further st_.~lated that 
DeBry will not be entitled to costs of court at this stage of 
the proceedings. However, if this case is remandec for a trial 
on the merits by any appellant court, the prevailing party at 
trial may seek costs pursuant to Rule 54(d) O.R.C.?. 
6. Graystonefs claim for attorney fees incurred in 
defending against plaintiff's claim for attorney fees shall be 
dismissed without prejudice, each party to bear its own costs 
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and attorney fees, and the parties agree that the statute of 
limitations with respect to GraystoneTs claim for attorney fees 
shall be tolled during the pendency of any appeal from the 
court's judgment awarding plaintiff attorney fees and the claim 
may be reasserted should any appeal by plaintiff result in 
remand for further proceedings to establish DeBry's attorney 
fees in the District Court. 
7. All other claims alleged in the counterclaim in this 
case have been fully compromised and settled and the 
counterclaim a d each count therein may be dismissed with 
prejudice, eacn party to bear its own costs with respect 
thereto, including attorney fees. 
8. Graystone shall neither directly nor indirectly raise 
or refer to the alleged malpractice; nor will graystone offer 
evidence of malpractice or negligence in the further 
proceedings or appeal to determine DeBry's attorney fees. 
DATED this j h day of /)0/)/%cA , 1988. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney^, Pro Se ^—^ 
4 JJ&C 
ROBERT UT. DEBRY / 
DATED this XI day of y ^ - ( ^ / _ 1988. 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER 
Attorneys foroGraystone Pines 
_ A — 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Graystone having waived its right to set a fee at less 
than $18,300; and this court having determined as a matter of 
law that the fee should not exceed $18f300; and the parties 
having made further stipulations as set forth above; now, 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Robert J. DeBry shall recover of defendant 
Graystone Pines Homeowners Association the sum of $19,321.35 
plus interest thereon through the date of judgment in the 
amount of $5,506.49 for a total judgment of $24,827.84. 
Interest shall accrue on said sum at the rate of 12% per annum 
as provided by law. This judgment is a final judgment. Each 
party to bear its own costs. However, either party may seek 
costs under Rule 54(d) U.R.C.P. in the event that this case is 
remanded by an appellant court for a trial on the merits. 
2. Graystonefs claim for attorney fees incurred in 
defending against DeBry1s claim for attorney fees is hereby 
dismissed without prejudice, each party to bear its own costs 
and attorney fees, but the statute of limitations with respect 
to Graystone1s claim for attorney fees shall be tolled during 
the pendency of any appeal from the court's judgment in the 
preceding paragraph and may be reasserted should any appeal of 
DeBry result in remand for further proceedings in this court 
for the purpose of establishing DeBry's attorney fees. 
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3. Graystone shall neither directly nor indirectly raise, 
or refer to, the alleged malpractice; nor will Graystone offer 
any evidence of malpractice or negligence in the further 
proceedings or appeal to determine DeBry's attorney fees. 
4. All claims alleged in the counterclaim in this case 
are hereby dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its own 
costs with respect thereto, including attorney fees. 
DATED this 4<T day of /f/A'/Jt'W , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTES\ 
H. DsXOrf KINDLE 
miKMJ 
DeoJt>' ~t« r* 
JUDGE RAYMOND UNO 
Third District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing STIPULATION, ORDER AND JUDGMENT (DeBry v. Graystone 
Pines Homeowners Assn.) was mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, 
this £ ) Q day of (Jlu/lAlV 1988, to the following: 
L. R. Gardiner, Jr. 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER 
50 South Main Street, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
d u ^ 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
This agreement is made this / j> day of 
/>? ^  / iJ^
 % , 1988, by and between Robert J. DeBry 
("DeBry") on the one hand and Graystone Pines Homeowners 
Association, John Webster, Roy Nielson, Florance Lewon, 
Carlos Croft and Louise Mallonee, individually anc as the 
Board of Managers of the Graystone Pines Homeowners 
Association (herei:after collectively referred to as 
"Graystone") on *i.e other; whereby Graystone, their 
successors and assigns, extinguishes any rights, cla.i-jr<: , 
actions or causes of action of any sort or kind against 
Robert J. DeBry, DeBry's employees and agents, including but 
nut limited to, any rights, claims, actions, or causes of 
action relating to or arising out of the malpractice 
asserted in Graystone s counterclaim against DeBry in the 
presently pending lawsuit between the parties in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
styled Robert J. DeBry v. Graystone Pines Homeowners 
Association, et al. , Civil , ;>. C83-5167 ("lawsuit , . 
In consideration of the mutual covenants contained 
herein and other good and valuable considerations, the 
parties agree as follows: 
1. DeBry agrees to pay to Graystone the sum of 
$3,500 at the time this agreement is executed. 
2. Graystone hereby releases DeBry, and his 
executors, administrators, employees, agents and assigns 
from any and all rights, claims, actions or causes of action 
or any sort or kxnd, whether Known or u n k w o w . ^ % c * 
Graystone may have against DeBry including, but not limited 
to, DeBry's dismissal of the "Black Substance" claim and 
Graystone's resulting allegations of malpractice against 
DeBry, including any rights, claims, actions or causes of 
action of any sort or kind asserted in Graystone's 
counterclaim in the lawsuit. 
3. It is agreed by Graystone that the 
consideration paid to it has been paid to compromise and 
settle disputed claims and that nothing contained herein 
shall be construed as an admission of liability on the part 
of DeBry and that DeBry makes no admission that he has in 
any manner whatever been indebted to Graystone. 
4. The parties agree that the terms of this 
settlement agreement shall be kept confidential and shall 
not be disclosed without the consent of the parties hereto, 
except that DeBry may disclose the terms of settlement to 
his insurance carriers and office staff and Graystone may 
disclose the terms of settlement to the individual members 
of the Homeowners Association for purposes of obtaining a 
resolution authorizing the execution of this settlement 
agreement. The parties recognize that because of tve 
relatively large number of people, including more than 32 
homeowners, to whom the terms of this settlement agreement 
must be disclosed, the terms of the settlement agreement may 
be inadvertently or innocently disclosed without any 
intention of causing harm to DeBry. Therefore, the parties 
agree that a disclosure of the terms of this settlement 
agreement, made without the conscious intent and purpose of 
causing injury to DeBry or his reputation, shall not be an 
actionable breach of the terms of this agreement. However, 
Graystone specifically agrees that it will advise the said 
homeowners of the confidentiality of this Agreement. 
5. In releasing its claims arising from DeBry's 
dismissal of the "Black Substance" claim and the resulting 
claims of malpractice asserted against DeBry in Graystone's 
counterclaim in the lawsuit, Graystone agrees that it shall 
neither directly nor indirectly raise or refer to the 
alleged negligence or malpractice; nor will Graystone offer 
any evidence of or relating to the alleged negligence or 
malpractice in the litigation or appeal of DeBry's pending 
claim for attorney fees in the lawsuit. 
6. DeBry's claim for attorney fees in the 
lawsuit is reserved. Specifically, DeBry reserves his right 
to appeal the trial court's determination setting attorney 
fees at $18,300 plus unreimbursed cosrs and interest and to 
thereby seek a higher award of attorney fees. 
7. Graystone waives it pending claim for 
attorney fees against DeBry unless and until this case is 
remanded by any appellate court for further proceedings. 
Graystone specifically reserves its right to reassert a> 
claim for attorney fees against DeBry if this case is 
remanded by any appellate court to determine the amount of 
DeBry's fee. 
8. Every person signing this agi -reraent 
represents, warrants and acknowledges that he has read and 
understood it, that such signature is his free and voluntary 
act, and that he has full authority; and authorization to 
bind those for whom and in behalf of which he has affixed 
his signature. 
WHEREAS, IN WITNESS HERETO AND IN AGREEMENT 
HEREOF, the parties by their authorized representatives, 
have affixed their signatures hereunto as indicated below. 
/ 
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, BY: 
'-JOHN WEBSTER, individually and 
as a member of the Board of 
Managers of Graystone Pines 
Homeowners Association 
ROY NIELSON, individually and 
as a member of the Board of 
Managers of Graystone Pines 
^Homeowners Association 
FLORANCE LEWON,] individually 
and as a member of the Board 
of Managers of Graystone Pine-
Homeowners Association 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
7v Si*-±/ms l^^r" 
CARLOS CROFT, indiyidually and 
as'"a member of the Board of 
Managers of Graystone Pines 
Homeowners Association 
-' ''?/,';£/- • - - v - f v 
LOUISE MALLONEE, individually 
and as a member of the Board 
of Managers of Graystone Pines 
Homeowners Association 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
My name is Mark Woodward. I give the following 
under oath: 
1. Sometime in 1980 I did some cement patchwork 
at the Graystone Pines condos. 
2. I was hired to do that work by Bill Kaiser 
who I think was president. 
3. After I had finished the cement patchwork, 
Mr. Kaiser asked me to give a bid for sealing around the 
joints where the wall meets the floor. 
4. At Mr. Kaiser's request, I gave an inflated 
bid of $78,000. Both Mr. Kaiser and I knew that it would 
not cost anywhere near $78,000 to do the work, but I gave 
that inflated bid as a favor to Mr. Kaiser. 
5. It has been so long ago that I don't recall 
the exact amount of my true bid, but it was probably less 
than $10,000. 
DATED this //ffiday of ^ 4 ^ ^ 1986 
MARK WOODWARD 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this AL^ day of 
d/y/^OU 1986. 
^ 
PUBLIC ~^/ ^
 / y j /f'j 
/ ^esidir 
My Commission Expires: 
CJ r, ^ /Q ^ 
/IM^S 
i ing at;
 t %//J&£? f <£~ 
EXHIBIT 3 
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business. This Is the fair meaning of the 
direction to pay or place 4for the account of 
Garbrecht & Co.* If, in fact, Garbrecht & 
Co. had made no arrangements with Luer> 
man & Son to place the money to their 
credit with defendants, and had not author-
ized it to be done, then the plaintiffs pal<L 
over the money under a mistake.9* Assum-
ing for the argument only that the learnea 
judge is correct in his statement of what 
presumption would arise from the cablegram, 
the plaintiffs had no possible Interest in what 
Garbrecht & Co. might do with the money. 
If the credit was given exclusively to Luer> 
man, then all that the plaintiffs were required 
to do was to comply with Lnerman's dlrets 
tions. It mattered nothing to them whether 
Garbrecht or any one else had ordered the 
payment of this money, so long as the credit 
or responsibility of the person alleged to have 
ordered the payment was not pledged. It 
is said by another learned judge: "It Is 
proven that Garbrecht disclaimed and dis-
avowed the relation imputed to him to the 
transaction, and did not authorize the pay. 
ment to be made on his account and would 
not adopt i t The plaintiffs were misled by 
Lnerman's cable message and paid the money 
to the defendants through mistake." Herfe, 
again, we are brought to the question a), 
ready discussed. If the cablegram purport-
ed to pledge Garbrechfs credit, undoubted-
ly he could repudiate the transaction as un-
authorized by him. But, if it did not purport 
to impose any liability on Garbrecht, there 
was nothing in the transaction for him to r^ » 
pudiate. The money paid was not his, and 
the claim on which it was paid also was not 
his, but his principal's. Therefore, in what-
ever aspect we view the case, its determine, 
tion (at this stage) turns on the single propo-
sition that the plaintiffs in paying the de-
fendants relied solely on the responsibility 
of Luerman, and neither in fact nor in their 
belief extended any credit to Garbrecht 
Hence there was no mistake as to any ma-
terial fact 
The judgment should be reversed, and ne\r 
trial granted, costs to abide the event 
GBAX O'BBIBN, yjUSN, WEBXEB, T50X-
LARD BARTLETT, and CHASE, JX, concur 
Judgment reversed, etc 
(190 N. T. 66.) 
In re SNYDER. 
SNYDER v. DE FOREST WIRELESS 
TELEGRAPH CO. et al 
(Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 19,1907.) 
1. ATTOROTEX jura CLIENT — LIEN FOB SERV-
ICES—MONET PAID INTO COUBT. 
Where money was paid into court on a set-
tlement between the parties, without the con,, 
sent of plaintiffs attorneys, who had a contract 
for a contingent fee, the attorneys had a lien 
on the entire fund so deposited, both under th.e 
express provisions of Code Civ. Proa $ 66, and 
under the order for settlement which directed 
f payment of the proceeds into court to Mrw«w 
• to the lien of plaintiff's attorneys," without**, 
limitation on the amount to stand as ucurir* 
for such services. ^; 
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent Dfc 
vol. 5, Attorney and Client, $ 400.] ^ 
2. SA^ OE—CONTBACT BETWEEN ATTOBSET AJH> 
CLIENT—PBOVISION AGAINST SETTUQCENT. -5 
A provision in a contract between attorney 
and client for a contingent fee, that the dienc 
should not make a bona fide settlement without 
the attorney's consent, was contrary to public 
policy and invalid.
 r # [Ed. Note.—For cases in point see Cent Dit 
voL 5, Attorney and Client, § 407.]
 f% 
3. SAME — CONTINGENT FEE — SETTLEMENT-1 
QUANTUM MEBUIT. 
A contract for attorney's services provide* 
for payment of a percentage of any recovery; 
and prohibited a settlement without the attor-
ney's consent Held that though the prorisio* 
restraining settlement was invalid, it was m 
connected with the clause fixing the compensa-
tion that neither could be sustained, so that the 
client having settled the litigation without the 
consent of the attorneys, they were not bound 
to accept the • percentage of the settlement in 
satisfaction for their services, but could reco^ 
er the reasonable value thereof. 
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point see Cent Dig, 
vol 5, Attorney and Client, i 353.] 
Edward T. Bartlett, J„ dissenting. ~ 
Appeal from Supreme Court Appellate Di-
vision, First Department ^ 
Action by Henry B. Snyder against the De 
Forest Wireless Telegraph Company and oth-
ers, In which plaintiff Snyder applied for 
payment out of court of moneys deposited to 
the credit of the action, to which James A. 
Allen and Roger Foster, his attorneys in the 
original action, objected. From an order of 
the Appellate Division, objectors appeal Re-
versed, and judgment of Special Term af-
firmed. 
See 99 N. Y. Supp. 644, 113 App. Div. 840. 
This is an appeal from an order reversing 
an order of the Special Term which appoint-
ed a referee to determine the value of legal 
services performed by the appellants in order 
that the amount of their lien upon certain 
moneys paid into court might be determined. 
Said order appealed from also permitted the 
respondent Snyder, who was the client of 
said appellants, to withdraw from court a 
certain amount of the moneys held therein, 
Roger Foster, for appellants. George P. 
Breckenridge, for respondent 
HISCOCK, J. The appellants, who are 
practicing attorneys, made a written agree-
ment with the respondent for the prosecu-
tion by them in his behalf of litigation 
against various parties under a plan of 
contingent compensation. Said agreement 
amongst other things, originally provided 
that the attorneys should receive for their 
services one-third of the proceeds of said 
litigation or the proceeds of the sale of cer-
tain stock, and nothing else; also, that nei-
ther party to the agreement should "settle 
any of said litigations without the consent 
of each of the other parties." Subsequently 
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tiiis agreement was modified so as to provide 
tli.it the compensation should be one-half 
ln-tead of one-third. Various actions and 
proceedings were Instituted under this re-
tainer, and, as is claimed by the appellants, 
services of much value were rendered to the 
client After a time Snyder entered into 
negotiations with the parties whom he was 
prosecuting for a settlement of the litigation, 
and not only without the consent of his at-
torneys, but in spite of their protest made an 
agreement for such settlement for the sum of 
$7,500. Still later a motion was made by the 
party with whom Snyder had made his 
agreement for an order settling and discon-
tinuing the litigation for the sum agreed up-
on, and to which motion both Snyder and the 
appellants were made parties. Notwith-
standing the opposition of the latter, and 
after the consideration of quite voluminous 
affidavits presented' by the attorneys and the 
client, respectively, in opposition to and in 
support of the settlement, an order was made 
granting the motion upon payment into court 
of the sum of $7,500 **to respond to the Hen 
of the plaintiffs attorneys." Some time lat-
er, a motion having been made by the client 
to withdraw one-half of this sum In accord-
ance with the terms of the agreement be-
tween him and his attorneys, the court di-
rected a reference to ascertain the value of 
the services which the attorneys had ren-
dered in order that the amount of their 
claims and lien upon the .fund might be de-
termined before Snyder withdrew any mon-
ey. This was done upon the theory that 
Snyder, by making a settlement in violation 
of the wishes of his attorneys, had so brok-
en his contract that the latter were no long-
er limited to the terms of their agreement 
tor their compensation, but were entitled to 
recover from the fund for the value of their 
services on the basis of quantum meruit 
As already indicated, the Appellate Division 
took the view that this order was improper, 
holding that the attorneys were limited so 
far as their lien upon the fund in court was 
concerned to the compensation fixed by the 
original agreement and relegated for any 
further relief to an action against their 
client for breach of contract We think that 
the disposition made by the learned justice 
at Special Term was correct, and that It was 
error to reverse the order then made and 
substitute the one from which this appeal is 
now taken. 
Some propositions involved in the appeal 
seem quite clear. The attorneys had a lien 
npon the moneys paid into court for the 
amount or value of their services, whatever 
it might be. This was secured to them by 
section 66 of the Code, and, in addition, the 
order allowing the settlement of the litiga-
tion and directing the payment of the pro-
ceeds into court expressly provided that the 
latter should "respond to the lien of the 
Plaintiff's attorneys" without any limitation 
should be allowed. If the clause prohibiting 
a settlement without the consent of the at-
torneys is valid, the client has prevented 
them from carrying out their contract, and 
they are entitled to treat it as terminated 
And recover the actual value of services ren-
dered before the breach without reference to 
the terms of the original contract If the 
clause prohibiting the settlement without the 
consent of the attorneys Is void as against 
public policy, so that it may be repudiated 
by the client, but yet is so connected with 
the clause prescribing the percentage of re-
covery which the attorneys were to receive 
as compensation that the latter clause falls 
with it, then, again, the attorneys must be 
entitled to recover the value of the services 
rendered by them upon the basis of actual 
worth. While the adoption of either view, 
therefore, would render necessary an ap-
praisal of the value of appellants' services, 
it is proper to determine which one shall 
prevail, assuming that the latter one is per-
missible, and In this determination the first 
and fundamental question will be as to the 
validity of the clause prohibiting a settle-
ment 
It has been decided so often and so fully 
that attorneys may undertake litigation for a 
compensation contingent upon their success-
ful efforts that It is unnecessary to refer to 
the decisions upon that point But this 
court, so far as I am aware, has never yet 
decided the naked proposition now urged up-
on us that an attorney, in furtherance of his 
contract for a contingent compensation, may 
reserve a veto power upon the right of his 
client to make in good faith an honest settle-
ment of his claim, and I think it would be 
unwise and opposed to sound public policy 
to so decide now. In the first place, a deci-
sion upholding such a contract would confer 
upon one person occupying a position of trust 
toward another unusual power over the lat-
ter in the control and management of his 
own property, for we must not forget that 
the attorney has only a lien upon the client's 
cause of action which still remains the prop-
erty of the latter. It is not too much to as-
sume that such power would at times be the 
source of abuse as between the two parties. 
But more Important than any such personal 
and private considerations Is the one of pub-
lic concern that such contracts would prove 
added obstacles to that quieting of disputes, 
and to that adjustment and settlement of 
litigation which always has been and al-
ways should be favored by the acts of Legis-
latures, the decisions of courts, and the ex-
pressions of public opinion; for, in my judg-
ment, there is no need of long argument to 
demonstrate that such contracts would prove 
such obstacles. We have before us in this 
very litigation an illustration of the manner 
in which they would be utilized If so per-
mitted to prevent settlements even when the 
attorney and client were involved In no other 
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about the amount which onght to be realized 1 
from the litigation. And, if this result would 
have happened where reputable attorneys 
were prosecuting what we are entitled to as-
sume was legitimate litigation with due re-
gard for the rights of their client, it requires 
no long vision to see how frequently the 
power would be used by reckless or unscru-
pulous attorneys to prolong litigation for the 
sole purpose of forcing a defendant or client 
or both to pay additional tribute in order to 
secure that settlement and peace which they 
desired, and public policy commended. 
It is urged that this power is necessary for 
the protection of attorneys. Courts are not 
unmindful of the fact that the system of con-
tingent compensation has the merit of afford-
ing to certain classes of persons the oppor-
tunity to procure that prosecution of their 
claims 'which otherwise would be beyond their 
means, and that the attorney should be pro-
tected from any dishonest attempt to deprive 
him of his compensation. On the other hand, 
no one having had an opportunity for obser-
vation can well close his eyes to the fact j 
that thfs same system many times promotes | 
litigation which is so unjustifiable that it ! 
. does not even rise to the level of being specu-
lative, and which, being carried forward by j 
unlawful and forbidden methods, leads some-
times to the enforcement of unjust recoveries 
from unfortunate defendants, sometimes to 
the exaction of unconscionable compensation 
from ignorant or helpless clients, and always 
to stirring up discord and lawsuits. In view 
of the relief which courts render against set-
tlements made with the dishonest purpose 
of cheating attorneys of their Just compensa-
tion, it does not often happen that a reputa-
ble attorney undertaking legitimate litigation 
for a contingent compensation is deprived of 
his just dues, and there seems to be no sub-
stantial necessity for approving a form of 
contract which would enable unworthy mem-
bers of the profession to increase existing 
evils through a power to manipulate and nul-
lify any disposition upon the part of their 
clients to settle their differences. While, as 
stated, the courts of our own state do not 
appear to have passed upon this precise ques-
tion, whatever has been said upon this gen-
eral subject of the right of a client, to settle 
litigation without interference by his attor-
ney confirms the view now being presented. 
In Lee v. Vacuum Oil Co., 126 N. Y. 579, 
27 N. Id 1018, the attorneys for the plaintiff 
had an agreement for a contingent compensa-
tion with a clause providing that no settle-
ment should be made without their consent 
After recovery of judgment, a settlement was 
made without the consent of the attorneys, 
and subsequently a motion was made on be-
half of them and of the client herself to va-
cate the settlement upon the ground of fraud. 
The question presented, therefore, arose be-
tween the attorneys and the opposite party and 
upon facts somewhat different from those 
before us. Still what was said by the court 
is pertinent to the general subject now beings 
discussed. In its behalf Judge Ruger wrote4" 
as follows: "We are of the opinion that th*-< 
existence of such a lien in favor of the attor-* 
ueys does not confer a right on them to standi 
in the way of a settlement of an action which * 
is desired by the parties, and which does not' 
prejudice any right of the attorneys. We doj 
not think that such an agreement deprives a., 
party of the right to control the management/ 
of his own cause, and to determine when the-
litlgation shall cease and how far it shall be 
extended. The client still remains the law-
ful owner of the cause of action, and is not 
bound to continue the litigation for the bene-* 
fit of his attorneys when he judges it pru-
dent to stop, provided he is willing and ablev 
to satisfy his attorneys' Just claims. In fact,* 
the lien under the agreement was Intended 
for and operates only as a security for the-
attorneys' legal claims, and, unless those are 
prejudiced by the client's contract, she has 
unrestricted control of the subject of the ac-
tion, and the terms upon which a settlement 
shall be effected." Flscber-Han3en v. Brook-
lyn Heights R. R. Co., 173 N. Y. 492, 66 N. 
B. 395, was an action brought to enforce the 
lien of the plaintiff upon a judgment which 
he had recovered for a client against the de-
fendant, and which judgment the latter, aft-
er notice of the attorney's lien, had secretly 
settled with the client, who was financially 
irresponsible. In writing in that case in be-
half of a unanimous court, Judge Vann laid 
down principles which certainly guide us 
in the direction of the conclusions already 
stated. Referring to the Hen given by the 
Code to the attorney upon his ftienf s cause 
of action, he wrote as follows: "The statute 
says that the lien (given by the statute) can-
not be affected by any settlement between the 
parties before or after judgment; but does 
it mean that no settlement whatever can be 
made without the consent of the attorney? 
It clearly means this, unless the lien is im-
pliedly transferred to the proceeds of the set-
tlement. But did the Legislature, in its ef-
fort to protect attorneys, intend to sacrifice 
the client by preventing him from making an 
honest settlement of his own cause of action? 
Did it intend to overturn the ancient and 
honored rule of law that settlements are to be 
encouraged by giving the attorney power to 
insist that the litigation must continue until 
he consents that it should stop? Did it in-
tend to so tie the hands of the client that he 
could not settle his own controversy without 
the permission of his attorney? A cause of 
action is not the property or the attorney, 
bnt of the client The attorney owns no part 
of it, for a lien does not give a right to prop-
erty, but a charge upon i t As it Is merely 
incidental, and for the purpose of security 
only, it would not be reasonable to hold that 
the Legislature Intended it should be the 
means of blocking an honest and genuine ad-
justment of controversies. We think the lien 
is subject to the right of the client to settle 
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In good faith, without regard to the wish of 
tie attorney, and we so held in the Peri Case, 
152 X. Y. 521, 46 ,N. B. 849, where we declar-
ed that *the existence of the lien does not 
permit the plaintiff's attorney to stand in 
tie vray of Jt settlement' • • • The Leg-
islature did not Intend to make the lien the 
chief thing, nor to compel the client to abdi-
cate hi9 position as principal in favor of the 
azeat or attorney whom he employed in or-
der to secure his rights. It did not Intend to 
prevent him from dealing with his own prop-
erty as he saw fit, provided he exercised his 
honest Judgment, and took no advantage of his 
attorney." In other states an abundance of au-
thority is to be found for the doctrine that a 
clause prohibiting the client from making a set-
tlement of Ms litigation without the consent of 
his attorney is void as against public policy. 
Huber v. Johnson (Supreme Court of Minne-
sota) 68 Minn. 74, 70 N.'W. 806, 64 Am. St 
Rep. 456; North Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Ack-
ley, 17111L 100, 49 N. E. 222, 44 L. R. A. 177; 
Lewis v. Lewis* 15 Ohio, 715, 716; Key v. 
Vattier, 1 Ohio, 132; Davis v. Webber, 66 
Ark. 190, 49 S. W. 822, 45 L. R. A. 196, 74 
Am. St Rep. 81.. These views lead to the 
conclusion that appellants are not entitled to 
recover from their client upon the quantum 
meruit upon the ground that the clause pro-
hibiting a settlement was legal, and, there-
fore, his acts in disregard thereof a breach of 
contract. 
But I do think that they may still recover 
upon that basis upon the other theory sug-
gested. The clause in the contract fixing the 
value of the services at a certain percentage 
of the recovery was connected with the pro-
vision that the attorneys should have a 
voice in any settlement and in determining 
the amount of any recovery by that pro-
cess. The two clauses were manifestly part 
of a single plan. Therefore, when the cli-
ent takes advantage of the invalidity of 
one clause and repudiates it, tne other one 
cahhot stand .aloiitf, Qui must fall iflth ft, 
aha the result or this again is to permit 
the attorneys to recover for the services 
which they have actually rendered accord^ 
tnft +* »frpir rofli value and independent of 
the original provision in tne contracTUgon 
this subject Davis v. Weboer, supra; uam-
mons v. Johnson, 69 Minn. 483, Tl JSL W. 663; 
Signww v. h'elgtf, 2X WIsTolgr" 
The order of the Appellate Division should 
be reversed and that of the Special Term af-
firmed, with costs. 
EDWARD T. BARTLETT, J. (dissenting). 
I agree with my Brother HISCOCK that toe 
appellants, the attorneys, are entitled to some 
form of relief in this proceeding. I am, how-
ever, unable to agree with the conclusion 
reached by him that an agreement between 
an attorney and client, creating a lien upon 
the cause of action, cannot lawfully contain 
the provision that neither party shall settle 
the litigation without the consent of the 
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other. If it be the fact that this court has 
never passed upon the validity of such a 
clause in a contract, I am of opinion that it 
is valid. I see no reason why counsel enter-
ing upon a long and difficult litigation for an 
impecunious client should not protect himself 
against a premature and ill-advised settle-
ment of the litigation by the client These 
contracts are under the strict supervision 
and scrutiny of the court, and I am unable 
to see anything in contravention of public 
policy when this clause appears to have been 
entered Into in good faith by both parties. 
In the absence of such a clause, it has been 
frequently held in this state and elsewhere 
that the client may negotiate an honest and 
reasonable settlement at any time. There is 
no reason in my judgment why this right 
cannot be waived. 
The Special Term held that the attorneys 
had a lien upon the $7,500 paid into court on 
the settlement, and that, the original contract 
having been abandoned by the action of the 
clients, it was competent for the attorneys 
to go before a referee and prove the reason-
able value of their services. If the services, 
however, were proved to exceed in value the 
?7,500 paid into court, the clients would in 
my opinion be liable for the excess in an ac-
tion by the attorneys to recover damages for 
a breach of the contract 
The order of the Appellate Division should 
be reversed and the order of the Special 
Term modified, so as to provide that, if the 
attorneys prove their services to be in value 
exceeding the sum of $7,500 paid into court, 
they may bring an action against the clients 
to recover this balance as damages for a 
breach of the original contract, and as so 
modified affirmed, with costs and disburse-
ments in the Appellate Division and in this 
court 
CULLEN, C. J., and O'BRIEN, HAIGHT, 
VANN, and CHASE, JJ., concur with HIS-
COCK, J. EDWARD T. BARTLETT, J., 
reads dissenting opinion. 
Ordered accordingly. 
(ISO N. T. 4L) 
WOOLVERTON v. FIDELITY & CASUAL-
TY CO. OF NEW YORK. 
(Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 19, 1907.) 
INSURANCE — EMPLOYES*S LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE—DUTY TO REPORT ACCIDENTS—NEG-
LECT OF SERVANT. 
Under the provision of a policy indemnify-
ing one against liability for injuries to others 
from its teams, that assured, on the occurrence 
of an accident and also on receiving informa-
tion of a claim on account of an accident, shall 
give immediate notice of the accident or claim 
to the insurer, insured is not excused from giv-
ing notice of an accident merely because none 
of its general officers or directors or any one 
who had the duty of adjusting: differences be-
tween it and the insurer had knowledge there-
of; but, while the knowledge of the driver who 
caused the accident is not imputable to insured, 
yet, if he reported it to one whose duty it was 
in the ordinary and natural conduct of the busi-
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EXHIBIT 4 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
Carmen Kipp 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
3 2 Exchange Place, #6 00 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 561-3773 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
GRAYSTONE PINE HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION; ROBERT BUSCH; 
RONALD COULAM; MELVIN JENSEN; 
the partnership of SNOW, 
CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, 
and JOHN WEBSTER; and 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
Defendants, 
vs. 
30KH WBSTOR, ROY NEI^SOtt, 
FLORENCE LEWON, CARLOS CROFT, 
and LOUISE MALLONEE as the 
BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE 
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION on behalf of the 
owners of all units in the 
Graystone Pines Condominiums, 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT J. 
DEBRY IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO VACATE ORDER 
GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
GRAYSTONE AND TO ENTER 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF DEBRY 
HONORABLE RAYMOND UNO 
Civil No. C83-5167 
Intervenors and 
Counterplaintiffs. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
My name is Robert J. DeBry. I give the following 
testimony under oath: 
1. In the underlying case between Graystone Pines 
Homeowners Association (hereafter Homeowners) and Graystone 
Pines, Inc., I was employed, in part, to litigate a structural 
defect known as the "black substance" claim. 
2. In order to save money in the preparation of the 
case, I instructed the Homeowners to work directly with archi-
tects and engineers to determine the extent of the damages. 
3. The information from architects and engineers 
was relayed to me, in part, by Mr. Bill Kaiser. Mr. Kaiser was 
for a portion of the litigation the president of the Homeown-
ers. After his term as president, he remained on an ad hoc 
committee of the homeowners which was charged with directing 
the lawsuit. 
4. In particular, I was told that Mr. Kaiser would 
obtain firm bids for repairing the "black substance" problem. 
My intent was to present live testimony as to the cost of 
repairing the "black substance" problem at trial. 
5. Mr. Kaiser continually told me that the cost of 
repairing the black substance problem would be $78,000. I told 
Mr. Kaiser that I needed a written bid, and he subsequently 
provided me with a written bid. (Exhibit A.) 
6. I relied on the representations that the true 
cost of repairing the "black substance" problem would be 
$78,000. I therefore relayed that figure to opposing counsel 
in response to discovery requests. I also planned for expert 
testimony an did legal research commensurate with the $78,000 
issue. 
7. In the last few days prior to trial, I insisted 
that I meet with the contractor in order to review his testi-
mony. At that time I met with one Mark Woodward. In reviewing 
the $7 8,0 00 bid with Mr. Woodward, it was immediately apparent 
that the $78,000 had no relationship at all to reality. It was 
further apparent that Mr. Woodward's testimony would not stand 
up in Court. 
8. I asked Mr. Woodward why he had prepared such an 
unrealistic bid. He replied to me that Mr. Kaiser had request-
ed an inflated bid to use as bargaining pressure and to intimi-
date the opposition. He said that he had fabricated the bid at 
the request of Mr. Kaiser. 
9. I therefore obtained my own expert who calculat-
ed the true cost to repair the "black substance" problem. The 
new expert computed the cost of repair to be approximately 
$9,000. That $9,000 bid included only the common areas, but 
since common areas were regarded as "party walls," most of the 
repairs fell within that $9,000 bid. 
10. My original contract with Graystone was for $50 
per hour (Exhibit B). Thereafter, Graystone asked me to change 
to a contingent fee basis, I was greatly opposed to that 
proposal; however, as an accommodation, I did agree to the 
change over (Exhibit C)• 
11. I do not recall whether the $78,000 figure was 
given to me before or after the changeover to a contingent fee 
(Exhibit C). However, I had been assured by Mr. Kaiser from 
the very beginning of the relationship (and well before Exhibit 
C) that the expenses for repairing the "black substance" issue 
would be very substantial. 
12. If I had known the true facts at any time prior 
to Exhibit C, I would never have agreed to the changeover. 
13. If I had known the true facts shortly after 
Exhibit C, I would have felt justified to renegotiate the 
contract, or to withdraw altogether. I would also have had the 
option of reducing the legal work and expert fees involved in 
the "black substance" issue. I certainly would never have 
invested such a monumental amount of time for the chance of a 
contingent fee on $9,000. 
14. As I have testified above, I did not learn the 
true facts until I met with Mr. Woodward shortly before trial. 
At that late date, I felt that I had no alternative but to 
press ahead with the trial date. Moreover, I felt that there 
were many innocent homeowners who were not part of the fraud. 
I felt that they had a right to their day in Court. And 
finally, we had already, at that point, issued subpoenas and 
paid for expert witnesses and prepared expensive exhibits. It 
was obvious that a delay in the trial, at that point, would 
have been enormously expensive. Furthermore, even if the judge 
allowed a continuance, he would have probably allowed costs to 
the defendants. Thus, I could not have withdrawn at that point 
without great expense to my clients and substantial 
inconvenience to innocent parties. 
DATED this ^3l day of l Ljd- 1986. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ,^?3 
WJr 1986. 
day 
NOTARY/ PUBLIC 
Residing at;V Jqjj-.JaMs (IMOTLL, 
* .< 
ftPl^---"" 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney, Pro Se 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAYSTONE PINES 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant and 
Counterplaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN WEBSTER, ROY NIELSON, 
FLORANCE LEWON, CARLOS CROFT, 
and LOUISE MALLONEE, as the 
BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE 
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION on behalf of ) 
the owners of all units in 
Graystone Pines Condominiums, 
Intervenors and 
Counterplaintiffs. 
STIPULATION, MOTION AND 
ORDER AMENDING JUNE 11, 
1986, ORDER 
Civil No. C83-5167 
JUDGE RAYMOND UNO 
STIPULATION AND HOTTON 
Plaintiff Robert J. DeBry and defendant Graystone 
Pines Homeowners Association and intervenors hereby agree 
r\n-" crr.ji 
that the court's prior order requiring that Graystone Pines 
Homeowners Association retain a minimum balance of $48,000 in 
Account Number 5200-40668 with Commercial Security Bank (now 
"Key Bank"), Sugarhouse Branch, be amended to permit Gray-
stone Pines Homeowners Association to pay the sum of 
$24,827.84 to Robert J. DeBry. 
It is further stipulated that plaintiff Robert J. 
DeBry may negotiate and receive the $24,827.84 without 
waiving his claims (including a pending appeal) that the 
judgment of 25 March 1988 is too low and that Robert J. DeBry 
is entitled to attorney fees (and interest) in excess of 
$24,827.84. 
Plaintiff and defendant and the interveners move 
the court to enter the following order. 
DATED this 2&~ day of jA^Cjj^c^ , 1988. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys Pro Se 
By / Lfr<sU S-' 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER 
Attorneys for Graystone Pines 
DINER, JR. 
ORDER 
Upon the foregoing Stipulation and good cause 
appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the court's June 11, 
19 86, Order denying plaintiff's motion to certify under Rule 
54(d) and requiring the Graystone Pines Homeowners Associa-
tion to retain a minimum balance of $48,000 in Account Number 
5200-40668 with Commercial Security Bank (now "Key Bank"), 
Sugarhouse Branch, pending disposition of this case, is 
hereby modified as follows: 
1. Graystone Pines Homeowners Association shall 
withdraw $24,827.84 and pay that amount to plaintiff pursuant 
to the court's Order of March 25, 1988; and the bank is 
authorized to permit the withdrawal of funds in that amount; 
2. Graystone Pines Homeowners Association is 
hereafter required to retain in Account Number 5200-40668 
with defendant Commercial Security Bank (now "Key Bank"), 
Sugarhouse Branch only a minimum balance of $23,172.16, which 
is the $48,000 reduced by the $24,827.84 paid to Robert J. 
DeBry as described above. 
3- The court's June 11, 1986, Order, except as 
modified hereby continues in effect. 
3 
4. Plaintiff Robert J. DeBry may receive and 
negotiate the said $24,827.84 without waiving his claims 
(including a pending appeal) that the judgment of March 25, 
1988 is too low and that Robert J. DeBry is entitled to 
attorney fees (and interest) in excess of $24,827,84. 
DATED this / ^ day of A-//^/ , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
District Court Judge 
ATTEST 
M. DI*ON HiKDLZfr 
By — 
V/7//// 
Do^Jtc Clerk 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing STIPULATION, MOTION AND ORDER AMENDING JUNE 11, 
1986, ORDER (DeBry v. Graystone Pines Homeowners Assn.) was 
mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this rQ.j day of 
f^YlCLu , 1988, to the following: 
L. R. Gardiner, Jr. 
CHAPMAN & CUTLER 
50 South Main Street, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Stephen Roth 
Bruche Garner 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
M. David Eckersley 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
INER & BROWN 
Suite 400 
I 
ah 84110 
Jeffrey Shields 
50 South Main,Suite 2011 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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